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The call for lower capital gains taxes won bipartisan support last summer.
Advocates claim that the reduction will increase output by re w a rd i n g
p roductive enterprise. However, Research Associates Michael Hudson
and Kris Feder point out that the great irony of the capital gains debate
is that most of the benefit of the reduction in capital gains taxes will not
go to investors in the stock market or in productive enterprises, but to
investors in real estate, a wholly unproductive sector. Because land
cannot be created (it is a natural resource that cannot be increased), an
investment in real estate cannot produce new wealth, that is, it cannot
increase the productivity of the economy; it merely changes the owner-
ship of existing re s o u rces. Gains from the appreciation of the value of
land are not a re w a rd for prod u c t i v i t y, but a windfall for ownership.
Given that two-thirds of capital gains are, in fact, real estate gains, a
capital gains tax reduction will have the effect of stimulating land specu-
lation rather than productive enterprise.
According to Hudson and Feder, generous depreciation allowances and
other provisions of the tax code allow investors in real estate in effect to
convert much of ordinary income into capital gains taxes and to shield
many capital gains from taxation. Not only are capital gains taxed at a
much lower rate than ordinary income, but taxes are deferred until time
of sale, making the effective tax still lower. Since these provisions leave
the capital gains tax as the only major federal tax that applies to re a l
estate, reduction of that tax leaves this giant industry almost exempt
from federal taxation.
Measuring the total effect of a capital gains tax cut is difficult because
national income statistics do not provide reliable estimates of sources of
capital gains or total returns to investors. For example, Internal Revenue
Service and Federal Reserve Board statistics tend to underestimate the
role of real estate and to underestimate the role of gains from land values
relative to building values. Many statistics on real estate, being based on
declarations on tax returns, tend to conceal and thereby perpetuate real
estate tax loopholes as well as the overall gains made in that sector as a
result of any cut in capital gains taxes.
Hudson and Feder agree that tax policy should be used to stimulate
productive investment, but demonstrate that a capital gains tax cut—as
PPB No.32  2/18/99  1:46 PM  Page 3“capital” gains are currently defined—will have the opposite effect and
actually reduce productive investment. To improve both the equity and
efficiency of the capital gains tax code, they suggest four changes. First,
distinguish between gains from land and true capital gains, tax the two
sources of gains separately, and increase the tax on land gains. Second,
reinstate capital gains taxes on buildings. Third, do not permit buildings
to be depreciated more than once. Fourth, re f o rm national income
accounting practices. If these changes are implemented, the capital gains
tax cut will reward and stimulate productive investment rather than act
as a giveaway to land speculation.
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p e rcent. This move, supporters claim, will spur productive enterprise and
c reate greater wealth for all. Supporters of the rate reduction re c o g n i z e
that the capital gains tax is designed to increase equity by taxing the
w e a l t h y, but, they claim, a high rate damages efficiency by taxing the
wealthy in their most productive behavior—investing their wealth—
t h e reby discouraging productive enterprise so much that it hurt s
e v e ryone. If we sacrifice eff i c i e n c y, they say, even in the name of equity,
we will in the end find we have less wealth to divide among us all.
Most of the debate on capital gains taxation centers on how much
incentive is needed to encourage productive investment. But, as
R e s e a rch Associates Michael Hudson and Kris Feder point out in this
brief, the debate neglects the important point that most capital gains are
not made on productive investment. In fact, two-thirds of capital gains
a re made on real estate, and most gains from real estate re p resent a
change in ownership of existing wealth, not the production of new
wealth. Most capital gains—as currently defined, measured, and taxed—
are not the fruits of productive investment, but the spoils of land specu-
lation. More o v e r, we in no way can assume that these spoils will be
funneled into productive investment.
The efficiency-equity trade-off warrants attention when any change in
taxes on productive investment is being considered, but the nature of
the investment must also be taken into account. The best course of
action is not an across-the-board reduction of all taxes on the wealthy.
Instead, Hudson and Feder point out, what needs to be done is to
7 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
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refocus taxes. It is reasonable to reduce the tax rate on capital gains on
truly productive investment if land gains are taxed separately at a higher
rate. Such a move could improve equity and efficiency simultaneously,
but the recent capital gains tax cut will not accomplish that. The effect
on the small portion of capital gains that derives from productive invest-
ment is likely to be overwhelmed by the effect on the large portion of
capital gains that is taken on land speculation. 
Hudson and Feder’s proposals for refocusing the tax code—separate land
gains from true capital gains and tax land gains at a higher rate, reinstate
the capital gains tax on buildings, prohibit depreciation of buildings
more than once, and improve national income accounting practices so
that sources of gains and total returns to investors can be measured more
a c c u r a t e l y — a re good first steps toward encouraging productivity and
discouraging speculation. We also hope that their analysis of funda-
mental issues encourages policymakers to reexamine old assumptions and
to examine more closely the effects of any proposed change in the tax
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The call for lower taxes on capital gains has had bipartisan support .
Advocates claim that a tax cut would reward productive enterprise, spur
new investment, and serve as a simple proxy for inflation indexing.
Some argue that the cut will, paradoxically, increase tax re v e n u e s — b y
encouraging productivity.
Much of the debate focuses on the stock market. Little notice is taken
of the fact that a large share of “capital” gains tax revenues are taken
not in the stock market or on any capital at all but in real estate. Data
collected by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Internal Revenue
S e rvice, and the Federal Reserve Board indicate that perhaps two-third s
of the U.S. economy’s capital gains—as they are now defined, measure d ,
and taxed—are generated in the real estate sector. Consider, also, that
the Federal Reserve Board estimated land values at some $4.4 trillion
and building values at $9.0 trillion for 1994. This $13.4 trillion of re a l
estate value re p resents two-thirds of the total $20 trillion in overall
assets for the United States economy (Federal Reserve Board 1995,
Table B.11). The capital gains tax is the major federal levy that applies
to real estate, so the recent cut in the capital gains tax rate has virt u a l l y
exempted this huge industry from federal taxation. More o v e r, there is
no reason to expect much stimulus to productive investment from such
a tax giveaway, especially if revenue losses are compensated for by
higher taxes elsewhere .
The principal justification for reducing the capital gains tax rate relies
on an efficiency-equity trade-off. The capital gains tax is designed to
i n c rease equity by taxing the wealthy, but, advocates of rate re d u c t i o n
Real Estate and 
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reduced the efficiency of the economy to the point where there is less
wealth for everyone; there f o re, the capital gains tax cut will stimulate
investment. The efficiency-equity trade-off is a valid point that cannot
be ignored when discussing taxes on productive investment. But,
because land cannot be produced, an investment in real estate mere l y
changes ownership of existing wealth; it does not produce wealth. Any
capital gains on the appreciation of land value are not a re w a rd for
p roductivity but a windfall for whoever happens to own land. Yet, the
capital gains tax treats a return from the appreciation of land the same
way it treats a return from improvements to land or from business invest-
ment. Such a tax structure is both inefficient (because it rewards unpro-
ductive investment) and inequitable (because it re w a rds some of the
wealthiest individuals at the expense of everyone else). There is an 
efficiency-equity trade-off on productive investments such as capital but
not on fixed assets such as land. 
C l e a r l y, a cut in the capital gains tax cannot cause the production of
m o re land. To the extent that capital gains are really land gains, to
reduce the tax rate is to transfer surplus from the Treasury to owners of
land. The incentive effect is to foster land speculation, not productive
enterprise. The current tax system is inefficient because it re w a rd s
u n p roductive investment—allowing it to avoid nearly all taxation by
taxing capital gains at a lower rate than other income and by allowing a
variety of exemptions and exclusions that further reduce the eff e c t i v e
tax rate. It forces productive factors to bear a larger tax burden and thus
reduces the incentive for productive investment. The current tax system
is inequitable because it rewards landowners (who tend to be at the high
end of the income distribution) at the expense of everyone else.
Therefore, separating land gains from capital gains and taxing land at a
higher rate can increase both efficiency and equity.
The main points of this paper are as follows:1 First, generous depre c i a t i o n
allowances and other provisions of the tax code allow investors in re a l
estate in effect to convert much of ord i n a ry taxable income into capital
gains, which are taxed more lightly. The incentive effect of these tax ru l e s
p a rtly explains why the lion’s share of taxable capital gains are earned in
the real estate sector. So successful are these devices that the real estate
i n d u s t ry has paid almost no federal income tax in recent years.
W h a t ’s Missing from the Capital Gains Debate?
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the value of land. Land cannot be depreciated, but buildings can. A
s h a re of land gains is routinely imputed to buildings, thereby re d u c i n g
the tax on the property. The biggest irony of the capital gains debate is
that unlike true capital gains, land gains represent no labor or investment
on the part of the landowner, and therefore the taxation of land gains
has no deterrent effect on prod u c t i v i t y. Under the current tax cod e ,
f u rther reductions in tax rates on capital gains accruing to buildings
cannot be expected to have a positive effect on productivity.
T h i rd, measuring the total effect of a capital gains tax cut is diff i c u l t
because reliable estimates of aggregate capital gains are hard to come by
in the official statistics. National income accounting methodology frus-
trates attempts to measure total return, which includes asset appreciation
as well as current income. Statistics based on tax re t u rns conceal and
thereby perpetuate real estate tax loopholes.
Fourth, most of the benefits from the across-the-board reduction in the
capital gains tax rate will go to the real estate industry, where little if any
positive economic stimulus can be expected. If the goal of the tax cut is
to stimulate productive investment, then reductions should be targeted
to those sectors most likely to generate them.
In discussing faults of the capital gains stru c t u re, we are not here arg u i n g
in support of income taxation generally. We recognize that some of the
t h e o retical and practical problems in devising an equitable and eff i c i e n t
income tax are insoluble. Our point is that if income is to be taxed at all,
the distortions in economic activity caused by the tax will be exacerbated
by taxing some types of earnings more than others. An individual’s total
income is equal to the sum of his or her ord i n a ry income (net of
expenses) plus the net increase in the value of assets owned. In general,
an income tax system that taxes diff e rent forms of income at diff e re n t
rates creates incentives for people to substitute less-taxed for more - t a x e d
ways of earning income. Increases in the value of land and capital are
taxed separately, at lower rates, and later than other income. Distort i o n s
may be severe when production is taxed much more than asset appre c i a-
tion or when the earned income of labor and capital is taxed while
income from land rent is exempted. Overly generous depreciation sched-
ules result in relative undertaxation of the income from depreciable 
Real Estate and Capital Gains Taxation
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at the expense of new investment and employment.
The Effective Tax Burden on Real Estate
Real estate makes up two-thirds of privately owned assets in the United
States and accounts for an even larger proportion, about three-fourths, of
the economy’s capital consumption allowances.2 CCAs are deductions
from taxable income intended to allow investors to recover their invest-
ment as capital assets depreciate. In principle, the accumulated CCAs
should be sufficient to replace a building or other capital equipment at
the end of its useful life. Taxable property income includes only the net
revenue after this allowance for depreciation is deducted and not the
part of cash flow designated for the recovery of capital.
CCAs in the real estate sector have traditionally been, and continue to
be, excessive relative to true economic depreciation. One reason, as we
discuss below, is that an excessive share of total real estate value is
imputed to buildings, which are depreciable, relative to land, which is
not. Another is that depreciation schedules have been unre a l i s t i c a l l y
rapid relative to the rate of depreciation of buildings. The depre c i a t i o n
schedules enacted in the 1981 tax code, which remained in place
t h rough 1986, were especially generous. However, the gre a t e s t
accounting fiction for the real estate industry arises from the pro v i s i o n
of the current tax code that allows a pro p e rty (but not an owner-
occupied residence) to be depreciated by each new owner every time it
is sold or swapped. This provision permits real estate investors to re c a p-
t u re principal again and again on the same stru c t u re as a building is
resold at rising prices.
The relative size of the capital consumption allowance affects the way in
which the total income from an asset is divided, for tax purposes,
between capital gains and ordinary income. This is because the taxable
capital gain for, say, a building is computed with re f e rence to its book
value, which equals the price at which the building was originally
purchased minus the accumulated capital consumption allowance, calcu-
lated according to the depreciation schedules of the tax code. 
W h a t ’s Missing from the Capital Gains Debate?
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and then resells it when it is fully depreciated and CCAs are due to
expire. Suppose there is a straight-line depreciation schedule based on a
presumed building life of 20 years, so that each year for 20 years $5,000 is
deducted from gross income in the computation of ordinary income tax.
The total value of the tax savings depends on the individual’s marginal
tax rate. If the investor sells the building after 20 years for $130,000 and
if there has been no inflation, the investor’s real gain is $30,000, but the
taxable capital gain is $130,000. This is because taxable gains are
computed, not as the diff e rence between the purchase price and the
price received at sale, but as the difference between the sale price and
the book value of the asset. The book value is the depreciated value,
which is presumed to be zero after 20 years. Of course, the new buyer can
depreciate the building again, using the sale price as the base of the new
book value. This is the way in which excessive capital consumption
allowances convert ord i n a ry taxable income into taxable capital gains.
Most capital gains in real estate today represent repeat gains over unreal-
istically written-down book values. 
If ord i n a ry income and capital gains were taxed at the same eff e c t i v e
rate, there would be no loss to the Treasury through CCAs; the income
tax revenue shortfall from the excess CCAs would be compensated for
later by capital gains revenue of equal present value. The problem is that
capital gains are taxed later and at lower rates than ordinary income and
the tax is deferred. Because capital gains taxes are paid at the time of
realization (sale) and not as the gains accrue, the effective burden is less
than the statutory rate, which is already lower than the ordinary income
tax rate. The longer an asset is held or the higher the interest rate at
which future income is discounted, the smaller is the sum of money that
needs to be set aside in an interest-earning savings account in order to
cover the future tax payment when it comes due—in other words, the
smaller is the present value of the tax burden.
Because the effective tax rate on capital gains is lower than that on ordi-
nary income, one effect of excessive depreciation is to reduce the overall
tax burden on real estate. This accounting fiction enables real estate
investors to continue indefinitely to take their income in the lightly
taxed form of capital gains. Further reductions in the capital gains tax
Real Estate and Capital Gains Taxation
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avoidance and would virtually exempt real estate from federal taxation.
The tax deductibility of mortgage interest, which is the real estate
i n d u s t ry ’s major cost, has helped to reduce the industry ’s tax liability.
M o rtgage interest now absorbs 7 percent of national income, up fro m
just 1 percent in the late 1940s. The real estate sector generates well
over $300 billion in interest payments, more than it contributes in
combined income taxes and state and local property taxes. Real estate is
the major form of collateral for debt, generating some two-thirds of the
i n t e rest paid by American businesses. Mortgage debt of $4.3 trillion
re p resented about 46 percent of the economy’s $9.3 trillion private
nonfinancial debt in 1994 (Federal Reserve Board 1995, Table L.2).
Capital consumption allowances exempt much of what remains of cash
flow after interest costs, so real estate generates little ord i n a ry taxable
income. Many investors operate at a nominal loss, leveraging their prop-
erties to the hilt. Their hope is to ride the wave of increasing land values
and “cash out” by selling their property for more than they paid. In fact,
i n d u s t rywide statistics show that real estate corporations and part n e r-
ships have recently reported net losses year after year.3 The capital gains
tax is thus the only major federal levy paid by the real estate industry. 
N u m e rous exemptions further shield many capital gains from taxation.
Major commercial real estate investors, such as pension funds, insurance
companies, other large institutions, and foreign investors, are exempt
f rom capital gains taxes.4 Substantial exclusions for capital gains on the
sale of owner-occupied homes have long been permitted and have
recently been broadened. No capital gains duties are levied on estates
passing to heirs. Assets given as gifts are taxed only if and when they are
later sold by the recipient. Real estate swaps, transfers of pro p e rty thro u g h
m e rgers, and certain acquisitions are not taxed on their capital gains. 
Fazzari and Herzon (1995) estimate the effective capital gains tax rate by
halving the statutory rate to account for the numerous exclusions and
exemptions and then halving it again to reflect the benefits of deferring
taxes until realization. If this estimate is correct, the former nominal
capital gains tax rate of 28 percent translates into an average effective
W h a t ’s Missing from the Capital Gains Debate?
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to just under 20 percent, the effective rate will be less than 5 percent.
In the aggregate and over the long run, rising land values tend to more
than offset the decline in building values so that total pro p e rty value
increases. In practice, a significant portion of land appreciation tends to
be imputed erroneously to buildings, expanding capital consumption
allowances still further.
Another effect of favorable depreciation, mortgage interest, and capital
gains tax treatment is to spur debt pyramiding for the real estate industry.
The tax stru c t u re provides a distort i o n a ry incentive for real estate
holders to borrow excessively, thereby converting rental income into a
nontaxable mortgage interest cost while waiting for capital gains to
accrue. This, along with financial deregulation of the nation’s S&Ls, was
a major factor in the overbuilding spree of the 1980s following the
reduction of capital gains taxes and the extreme shortening of schedules
for capital consumption write-offs in 1981. Worldwide, episode after
episode illustrates the inherent instability of an economy whose banking
system relies on land as a principal form of collateral for loans. Currently,
for instance, as re p o rted in The Wall Street Journ a l, “Thailand is in a
woeful state. . . . There is a massive overhang from the real estate bubble
whose burst laid the banks low” (Gonzalez 1997, A22).
One justification for the cut in the capital gains tax rate is that it will
reduce the “lock-in effect” whereby high taxes on realized gains (due at
the time of pro p e rty transfer) deter asset sales. It is doubtful, however,
that a rate reduction is likely to accelerate real estate turnover. Turnover
in real estate is strongly affected by depreciation rates. In periods of rapid
write-offs—most strikingly during the 1980s, when real estate could be
written off faster than in any other period—buildings tend to be sold as
soon as they are depreciated. There is evidence that lock-in results less
from high capital gains tax rates than from inheritance taxes (Gaffney
1991; Joint Committee on Taxation 1990, 21).
The 1986 reforms reduced the incentives for this rapid turnover, but the
principle is clear: When depreciation rates are high, there is a powerful
tax-induced incentive to sell a building when it is fully depre c i a t e d .
Real Estate and Capital Gains Taxation
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would encourage investors to sell their assets. While it is true that “tril-
lions” of dollars are locked up in mature, relatively nonproductive low-
cost assets (Hauser 1995), most of these mature assets take the form of
depreciated real estate. Although real estate prices have stagnated, the
book value of buildings has been diminished by much more.
Now that these buildings are fully depreciated, owners have incentive to
sell or swap them once again so as to continue sheltering their income.
The effect has been to leave substantial capital gains to be declared in
the near future, while the pro p e rties can be sold for much more than
their depreciated value. This lends renewed urgency to the campaign to
cut capital gains tax rates. Even before the rate cut, however, turnover in
real estate may have surged as investors exploited depreciation rules to
maximize their gains from pro p e rties acquired under the accelerated
d e p reciation rules of the 1980s. The recent rate cut is a giveaway,
making permanent the income tax deferral from excessive CCAs.
The budget crisis aggravated by such a policy also ends up forcing public
resources to be sold off to meet current expenses, sold to the very wealth
holders being freed from taxation. In this way wealth consolidates its
economic power relative to the rest of society and translates it into polit-
ical power so as to shift the tax burden onto the shoulders of others. The
first element of this strategy has been to defer revenue into channels that
are taxed only later, as capital gains. The second has been to tax these
gains at a lower rate than earned income.
M e a s u rement Problems in National Income Statistics
In view of the fact that real estate is the economy’s largest asset category —
and land its major component—it is desirable to put the capital gains debate
in perspective by compiling adequate statistics to trace land and building
values. Unfort u n a t e l y, published statistics do not permit reliable estimates of
capital gains in real estate. The most recent benchmark for capital gains in
the U.S. economy is an IRS sampling of capital gains declarations on 1985
income tax re t u rns, pre p a red in connection with the Tax Reform Act of
1986. By 1990 these data were analyzed in two studies (Holik, Hostetter,
W h a t ’s Missing from the Capital Gains Debate?
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IRS in its Statistics on Income, but they cover only a portion of the capital
gains spectrum (Internal Revenue Service 1994, 1995).
The IRS benchmark survey estimated 1985 capital gains at $208 billion,
an amount equal to only 6.4 percent of that year’s $3.3 trillion national
income. An analysis of how these capital gains were distributed between
land and buildings, plant and equipment, other direct investment, and
the stock market indicates that the economy’s capital gains are mostly in
real estate, and in greater pro p o rtion than the IRS benchmark study
suggests. For pro p e rties sold during the year, including the values
e m b odied in stock market equities, we interpret the IRS survey as
suggesting land value gains of about $97 billion. This does not include
institutional or foreign real estate holdings, for these are not subject to
taxation and thus were excluded from the IRS sample. The IRS statistics
show only what individual persons who sold assets in 1985 declared on
their tax re t u rns. Table 1 tracks land gains as a percentage of total
reported capital gains for the 1985 IRS data.
Within these limitations of scope, sales of principal residences totaled 
$37 billion (reported on Form 2119), accounting for 19 percent of the
capital gains sample. However, the statistics were swamped by the
$125,000 exclusion for capital gains on sales of owner-occupied homes.
This exclusion was so large, coming as it did just as the real estate bubble
was peaking, that it reduced the pro p o rtion of taxable capital gains
accounted for by residential sales from 19.0 percent to just 1.1 percent of
the sample. 
Reported capital gains in real estate were understated as a result of exclu-
sions. On the other hand, much direct investment included the cost of
land, commercial buildings, and plant and equipment. Taking this into
account, we estimate that roughly 70 percent of the capital gains calcu-
lated by the IRS for 1985 probably represent real estate. Even this esti-
mate may understate the role of land and real estate. In 1985,
anticipating the planned 1986 tax re f o rm that would raise the capital
gains tax rate from 20 to 28 percent, many investors sold securities they
held that had re g i s t e red the largest advances. Some 40 percent of the
capital gains reaped by selling these stocks probably re p resented re a l
Real Estate and Capital Gains Taxation
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the stock market was an awareness that real estate gains were not being
reflected in book values and share prices; as land prices leapt upward—
funded in part by looser regulatory restrictions on S&L lending against
land—raiders bought publicly traded companies and sold off their assets,
including real estate, to pay off their junk-bond backers. In effect, not
only were rental income and profits being converted into a flow of
interest payments, so also were capital gains.
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Table 1  Estimated Land Gains as a Percentage of Total Reported Capital
Gains, 1985
S o u rce of  %o f
X %L a n d = Land Gains %C a p i t a l Other as
1985 Gains To t a l G a i n s a s%of To t a l I m p ro v e m e n t s %of To t a l
L a n d 7 . 0 1 0 0 7 . 0 — —
F a rm l a n d 0 . 9 1 0 0 0 . 9 — —
Distribution fro m
p a rtnerships and 
S - c o r p o r a t i o n s 9 . 5 8 0 7 . 6 1 0 0 . 9
Business real estate 1 0 . 3 8 0 8 . 2 2 0 2 . 1
Rental real estate 1 1 . 8 4 0 4 . 7 6 0 7 . 1
Principal 
re s i d e n c e s 1 9 . 0 4 0 7 . 6 6 0 1 1 . 4
Corporate stock 3 3 . 0 2 0 6 . 6 2 0 6 . 6
Mutual funds 1 . 0 2 0 0 . 2 2 0 0 . 2
Bonds and
other securities 0 . 8 — — — —
C o m m od i t i e s
and future s 0 . 2 — — — —
Business machinery
and equipment 1 . 5 — — — —
F a rm livestock 1 . 0 — — — —
Ti m b e r 0 . 2 — — — —
Other assets 3 . 9 — — — —
To t a la 1 0 0 . 0 % 4 2 . 9 % 2 8 . 3 %
aColumns don’t add up because of rounding.
Source: Internal Revenue Service benchmark survey prepared in connection with the Tax
R e f o rm Act of 1986. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income—1991: Individual
Income Tax Returns (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994); Internal
Revenue Service, Statistics of Income—1992: Corporation Income Tax Returns (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).
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$208 billion of taxable capital gains. The Fed’s Balance Sheets for the
United States Economy (Federal Reserve Board 1995) lists the total
value of land, buildings, and other real assets. For produced capital, the
annual increase in aggregate asset values does not distinguish capital
gains on existing assets from the value of new production. For land,
h o w e v e r, the value of new production must be zero, so the entire
annual increase constitutes capital gains—accurately, land gains.
A c c o rding to the Fed, aggregate building values increased by $204
billion in 1985, while land prices rose by $356 billion, appro x i m a t e l y
t h ree and a half times the ($108 billion) value implied by the IRS
statistics. 
The Federal Reserve Board provides an implied estimate of land gains
(and a measure of building gains that does not include overdepreciation
pay-backs re c o rded fictitiously as capital gains) in its Z9 release esti-
mating asset values throughout the economy. However, the IRS and the
Fed are not measuring capital gains in the same way. The Fed measures
the overall nationwide market value of land and buildings, while the IRS
sample includes only pro p e rties sold during the year. Furt h e rm o re, the
IRS statistics do not include capital gains on which no taxes are due
because of exclusions. 
On the other hand, the Fed statistics (Federal Reserve Board 1995,
Tables B.11, B.12, R.11) understate land values for method o l o g i c a l
reasons. Starting with estimates for overall real estate market prices, Fed
statisticians subtract estimated replacement prices for existing buildings
and capital improvements to derive land values as a residual. These
replacement prices are based on the Commerce Depart m e n t ’s index of
c o n s t ruction costs. Thus, building values are estimated to incre a s e
steadily over time, on the implicit assumption that all such property is
worth reproducing at today’s rising costs. 
H o w e v e r, the value of any building tends eventually to decline, until
finally it is scrapped and replaced. It is the value of land that tends to
rise as population and income grow (over the long run, with cyclical
swings), precisely because no more land can be produced. Thus, capital
gains in real estate result mainly from land appreciation. 
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buildings undergo locational obsolescence as neighborh o od land uses
change over time, so market prices tend to fall below replacement costs. It
would not be economical to rebuild many types of stru c t u res on the same
site if they were suddenly destroyed. In part i c u l a r, where land use is inten-
sifying over the long run, rising land values effectively drain the capital
value out of old buildings. This is because the salvage value of land (its
w o rth upon renewal) tends to rise, while the scrap or salvage value of most
immovable improvements is negligible. Where land has alternative uses,
rent is not its current net income but its opportunity cost—the minimum
yield re q u i red by the market to warrant keeping the land in its present use
instead of converting it to the best alternative use. As the land value rises,
a rising share of the pro p e rty income must be imputed to the land and a
falling share remains to be imputed to the impro v e m e n t s .5
Thus, the correct way to separate land values from building values is to
appraise land values directly in terms of opportunity cost—how much
would a vacant lot at that site fetch in the market? If the observ e d
market value of the improved pro p e rty exceeds the land value, the
residual is the implied value of the standing improvements. The Fed’s
land residual method theoretically understates the land share of re a l
estate values (Gaffney 1993). The pitfall of this methodology is demon-
strated to an almost comical degree by the fact that according to Fed
statistics, the land component of corporately owned real estate has been
reduced to near zero over the past five years (while the nominal re p ro-
duction costs of factories and other corporately held buildings are
inflating). 
The measurement problem is exacerbated by assessment bias in many
states and localities. Particularly where land values are rising, overesti-
mates of building values relative to site values reflect the steady under-
assessment of land. Note that as a larger share of real estate value is
imputed to buildings, a larger share of cash flow can be claimed as 
depreciation. In effect, assessment bias allows investors to partly depre-
ciate land, at no cost to local government budgets.6
O fficial statistics should provide a sense of how the economy works.
Especially when it comes to real estate, however, national income 
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of income tax filings and hence are distorted for both administrative and
political reasons; they do not reflect fundamental categories of economic
analysis. One searches in vain, for example, for an estimate of the distri-
bution of total income among land, labor, and capital or for an
accounting of how re n t i e r claims on revenue and output are layere d
upon directly productive enterprise. Thus the present GNP/NIPA format
fails to diff e rentiate consistently among land, produced wealth, and
financial claims. In the real estate sector most “capital gains,” in the
colloquial sense of rising market prices, accrue to land, but IRS statistics
mainly catch the landlord’s fictitious declaration of the loss in building
values through overdepreciation.
Policy Implications
Wealthy investors have won congressional support for real estate exemp-
tions in large part by mobilizing the economic ambitions of homeowners.
The real estate industry and the financial sector, riding on real estate’s
shoulders, have found that the middle classes are willing to slash taxes
on the wealthy as long as their own taxes are cut even lightly. Thus it is
no surprise that President Clinton’s first major concession to the pressure
for cutting capital gains taxation was directed at homeowners, despite
the fact that further preferences for home ownership cannot readily be
justified as a boost to homeownership or industrial enterprise.
Economic policy should distinguish between activities that add to
p roductive capacity and those that merely add to overhead. This
distinction elevates the policy debate above the level of merely carping
about inequitable wealth distribution and attacks by have-nots on 
the haves and moves it closer to fundamental questions: What ways 
of procuring income deserve fiscal encouragement, and how may
economic surpluses best be tapped to support government needs?
Policies that subsidize private collection of socially generated value, like
the value of a vacant lot near a railway station or in a bustling urban
c e n t e r, while penalizing re t u rns to productive eff o rt have grave implica-
tions, not only for distributive justice but also for economic stability,
e ff i c i e n c y, and gro w t h .
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rating three major sources of capital gains: real estate, as the economy’s
l a rgest re c o rder of capital gains (separable, in turn, into land and
improvements); other direct capital investment; and financial claims on
the income generated by this capital (stocks, bonds, and packaged bank
loans that are “securitized”). The failure of our national accounting
system to distinguish among these makes it easier for the real estate
i n d u s t ry to get its own taxes reduced along with industries in which
capital gains tax cuts do indeed tend to spur productivity.
Given the current U.S. depreciation laws and related institutions, the
a c ro s s - t h e - b o a rd cut in the capital gains tax rate will steer capital and
e n t re p reneurial re s o u rces to a search for unearned rather than earn e d
income. Far from being a stimulus to new investment, such a policy pref-
erentially benefits owners of already depreciated buildings and specula-
tors in already seasoned stocks, leading to further deterioration of
economic well-being. It re w a rds real estate speculators and corporate
raiders as it shifts the burden of taxation to people whose primary source
of income is their labor. In the real estate industry, for which the capital
gains tax is the only significant remaining source of federal revenue, a
rate cut would discourage new direct investment and employment while
encouraging the purchase and sale of existing buildings.
As for buildings, the pre f e rential tax treatment of capital gains, the
income tax deduction for mortgage interest, accelerated depre c i a t i o n ,
and above all the repeated re d e p reciation of old buildings after each
transfer are not cost effective means of motivating new investment.
Factory owners usually must junk their machinery when it wears out, and
depreciation allowances properly ensure that only net income, not gross
revenue, is taxable. Thus direct investors suffer less from capital gains
taxation than from ordinary income tax, which is applied sooner and at
a higher rate. Unlike other industrial assets, however, buildings most
often are not scrapped. Although they are depreciated when sold, they
typically are resold at higher prices than were originally paid.
Any capital gains tax relief should selectively favor productive enterprise
relative to the mere trading of nonproduced land or depreciated buildings
p roduced years ago. At minimum, a general capital gains tax cut should be
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v a l o re m taxation of land. More o v e r, capital gains policy should be evaluated
in comparison to alternative means of effecting similar results. A cut in the
p a y roll tax rate, for example, would be a surer stimulus to employment than
an acro s s - t h e - b o a rd capital gains tax cut. 
Following are four changes to the tax code that would improve equity and
e fficiency simultaneously.
Separate taxes on land gains from true capital gains taxes and increase
the tax on land gains. Land is created by nature, not by human
investors. Much of the value of land, especially urban land, is deter-
mined by its location with respect to surrounding public and private
infrastructure, other capital, and activities of all kinds. Land value is not
p roduced by the investment of individual landowners and users (they
contribute the improvements). There f o re, to the extent that taxable
capital gains are really land value gains, cutting the capital gains tax
deters rather than encourages new capital formation. On the contrary, to
cut taxes on land gains is to encourage land speculation, inducing less
intensive use of central lands and thereby raising the public, private, and
e n v i ronmental costs associated with a sprawling, inefficient pattern of
land use (Feder 1994, 146–148). Such a cut also accelerates rent-seeking
activities, which consume resources in the service of redistribution, not
production (Gaffney 1989, 1993).
Reinstate capital gains taxes on buildings. We agree with the premise
that to reduce taxation on the earnings of productive enterprise has
beneficial incentive effects. However, given fiscal rules permitting excess
depreciation of buildings to be recovered by deferred capital gains taxa-
tion at preferential rates, the tax code subsidizes speculation in existing
properties more than it stimulates new production. As real estate devel-
opers know, construction responds more to shifts in interest rates than 
to adjustments in the capital gains tax rate. Capital consumption
allowances absorb nearly all the rental cash flow left after paying mort-
gage interest, making cash flow virtually exempt from income taxes.
Because foreign investors and institutional investors are not subject to
capital gains taxes, the tax cut will not affect their real estate operations.
For these reasons the capital gains tax on buildings can be re i n s t a t e d
without an adverse effect on real estate improvements. 
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point at which much of the real estate industry now pays taxes on its
accumulated cash flow after taking capital consumption write-offs is
when a building is sold. To let the building be depreciated again is to
t r a n s f o rm what should be a current income tax liability into a deferre d
capital gains tax. This gives the real estate industry a unique gift.
D e f e rral of tax liability from the time when rental income actually is
e a rned until the time when the building is sold enables owners to avoid
paying their fair share of income taxes, transmuting ord i n a ry income
into a capital gain that is taxed at a far lower effective rate than ord i-
n a ry income. This deferral nearly doubles the private rate of re t u rn on
investment. 
As long as capital consumption allowances give the real estate industry a
p a rticularly generous income tax status, real estate investors will do what
they can to impute an excessive pro p o rtion of total real estate value to
d e p reciable improvements. More o v e r, as long as real estate income is
e ffectively exempted from the income tax, a powerful lobby will continue
the drive to substitute income taxes for state and local pro p e rty taxes.
I m p rove the quality of statistics and re f o rm NIPA accounting prac-
t i c e s . Estimates of capital gains from various sources are not easily found.
The accounting methodology frustrates attempts to measure the total
return to investors, which includes asset appreciation as well as current
income. Statistics based on tax returns conceal and thereby perpetuate
real estate tax loopholes.
Presently, U.S. statistics appear to undervalue land by at least a trillion
dollars (at about $4 trillion, down from the $5 trillion estimated in
1990). The Federal Reserve method of calculating land and impro v e-
ment values by estimating a building’s reproduction cost is inappropriate.
The market value of land should be evaluated independently, rather
than derived by subtracting the hypothetical replacement cost of build-
ings from market real estate values. The theoretically correct approach is
the building residual method of real estate assessment. One result of
consistently applying the building residual method would be to raise the
land share and lower the building share of assessed property value, and
thus narrow the depreciation loophole. IRS statistics now reflect 
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tion. The GNP/NIPA format does not diff e rentiate among land,
produced wealth, and financial claims. 
Not only will the cut in the capital gains tax rate make the distribution
of income more unequal, but just as importantly it will not have the
stimulating effect its supporters claim. Without some reform the capital
gains tax cut is primarily a giveaway to landowners that rewards specula-
tion not productivity.
N o t e s
1. This brief is based on Hudson and Feder (1997).
2. CCAs for various sectors are re c o rded in National Income and Prod u c t
Accounts (NIPA); see Hudson and Feder 1997, Tables 1a, 1b.
3. Real estate corporations paid some $1.3 billion in income taxes in 1988, a
mere 1 percent of the $137 billion paid by corporate America as a whole (U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis 1992, Table 6.18). Comparable figures are not
available on noncorporate real estate income tax liability, but the finance,
insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sector as a whole reported negative income
of $3.4 billion in 1988, out of a total $267 billion of nonfarm pro p r i e t o r’s
income (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 1992, Table 6.12).
4. In addition to playing a dominant role in real estate, these institutional
investors own nearly half of all U.S. equities (Minarik 1992).
5. Indeed, where ill-maintained old buildings occupy prime locations, a parc e l
may be more valuable once the building is demolished and the lot cleared for
reuse (Gaffney 1971, 1993). Some improvements, such as gas stations and
refineries, are accompanied by ecological pollution, which can be analyzed as a
negative improvement—the pro p e rty would be worth more without it.
Pollution may greatly increase the salvage cost of land, making it uneconomical
to salvage some lands despite the value they would have if clean. This “bro w n-
fields” problem has received considerable public notice in recent months.
6. Studies cited by Gaffney (1993) of assessed building values at demolition indi-
cate a tendency of assessors, too, to overvalue depreciable improvements. At
the moment of demolition, for example, a building’s value equals its scrap
value (if any) minus the cost of demolition. The result can easily be negative.
That is, the cleared land may be worth more than the parcel is worth with the
old building standing and its cleanup costs yet to be borne. The IRS may ques-
tion specific building appraisals, but the general practice is to accept the local
city assessment, which tends to favor buildings over land. It is well-known
that Fed statistics on the value of corporate land and buildings show an unre-
alistic low valuation of land. 
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